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Shlomo Avineri has recently argued that the main 
contribution of Hegel to political theory 'is his 
concept of the state.[1] Anglo-American philosophers, 
however, have generally found an intimation of German 
fascism in this theoretical innovation; yet the first 
serious challenge to the merit of Hegel's concept of 
the state can be found within the history of German 
philosophy itself and dates from as early as 1843. For 
it was in that year that the young Karl Marx wrote the 
manuscript now generally referred to as the Kritik des 
HegeIschen Staatsrechts.[21 Moreover, Marx's critique, 
although not actually published until 1927, is gen-
erally considered to be devastating.(3] Even so, as 
Avineri and the editors of the English translation of 
the work emphasize, Marx remained indebted to Hegel 
despite the trenchant criticism of this work. Avineri, 
in fact, goes so far as to suggest that the entire 
Marxist program can be interpreted as an attempt to 
realize the Hegelian idea of the state through revolu-
tionary praxis rather than the mystification of specu-
lative philosophy. Thus, according to Avineri, as a 
consequence of his criticism of Hegel Marx came to ap-
preciate the role of the economic order in the develop-
ment of the state structure much more fully than Hegel 
and also that the analysis of economic conditions was a 
life-long task necessary to bring about the true 
Aufhebung des Staates.[41 But, the tendency of most 
contemporary commentators, following Engels and Lenin, 
has been to think that subsequent to his criticism of 
Hegel, Marx was unalterably critical of the concept of 
the state and believed not in its "abolition and 
transcendence" but simply in its destruction and 
"withering away" (Absterben des Staates).[51 I am not 
so much concerned with simply recounting Marx's cri-
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tigue of the Hegelian Staatswissenschaft, as with indi-
cating more clearly the source of the misinterpretation 
and its roots in Marx's own unsympathetic reading of 
Hegel. The point of these remarks is neither to turn 
Marx into an Hegelian, nor Hegel into a proto-Marxian, 
rather it is to clarify the Hegelian views of the state 
and the early, pre-1848 "Marxist teaching on the State" 
and to assess the insights and deficiencies of both.(6) 
II 
The central idea of Marx's criticism of Hegel's 
concept of the state is Feuerbach's 'transformative 
method', but, if his own explanation of the project as 
reported in a letter to Arnold Ruge of 5 March 1842 is 
to be taken seriously, its inspiration is to be found 
in his contempt for the constitutional monarchy as a 
'self-contradictory and self-destroying hybrid' which 
was later to suppress the publication of his paper, the 
Rheinische Zeitung.|71 The Kritik was composed in the 
summer of 1843, after Marx had resigned as editor of 
the paper and while he was honeymooning in Kreuznach. 
As presently available, the manuscript consists of 
nothing more than notes on §§264-313 of Hegel's Rechts-
philosophie.181 Most of the manuscript is concerned 
with the section of Hegel's text dealing with the 
Legislature in the modern German state (§§ 298-320), 
but in this discussion Marx also goes far beyond 
Hegel's sketchy remarks and provides a somewhat 
detailed historical and economic analysis of the tradi-
tional German legislative bodies, the Estates. An 
earlier section on the Crown, however, relies most 
heavily upon the transformative method and seems to me 
to be the most shallow and uneven part of the commen-
tary. Between these is the shortest section which 
focuses on Hegel's similarly brief account of the 
Executive. The initial passages of the text also cor-
respond to Hegel's work and challenge the validity of 
the argument by which Hegel attempted to demonstrate 
that the state is the final stage of development of 
'ethical substance' transcending the family and civil 
society. . 
Clearly all that we have in Marx's manuscript is 
rough notes from his youthful study of Hegel's Rechts-
philosophie. The text is not, therefore, of consistent 
quality and there is a clear development from an ini-
tial preoccupation with the monarchy to a more detailed 
analysis of social and economic structures of contem-
porary German society in the section on the Legisla-
ture. In general, then, it appears that when Marx 
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finally sat down to compose his attack on the constitu-
tional monarchy, he began by doing little more than 
focusing on that portion of Hegel's text headed 'The 
State'. Yet as he became more involved in the study, 
he realized that the critique demanded more than could 
be achieved through the simple application of Feuer-
bach's method of analysis. For once the Hegelian in-
version of subject and predicate was clarified, it was 
also neccessary to examine the conditions of the sub-
ject itself, not simply in the mystifying categories of 
the Logic, but in the concrete terminology of histori-
cal and economic studies. Hegel, of course, would have 
argued that these methods confused the tasks of 
Staatswissenschaft. Marx, however, could hardly have 
begun with Hegel's desire to "apprehend and portray the 
state as something inherently rational".(9) Briefly 
then, if we are to assess Marx's criticism of Hegel and 
the similarities and differences between their views of 
the state, v/e must first consider Marx's critique of 
Hegel's account of each of these 'moments' of the 
state, the Crov/n, the Executive, and the Legislature, 
decide whether or not he had accurately represented 
Hegel's views, and, even if so, whether or not his 
criticisms were justified. But we should also be espe-
cially sensitive to discover why it was that what 
seemed so 'inherently rational' to Hegel in 1821 could 
seem so irrational-to Marx in 1843. For Hegel, in the 
Preface to his v/ork, had emphasized that it was an at-
tempt to portray the state as it actually existed and 
clearly distinguished his task from an attempt, whether 
theoretical or practical, "to construct a state as it 
obght to be."(10] There is, therefore, primae facie 
legitimacy to Marx's criticism of the work as an at-
tempt to rationalize the existing German state. 
Nevertheless, there may v/ell have been a vast diff-
erence between the working of the German states of the 
1810's and that of the 1840'8.(11) 
If one were then to read §§257-329 of the Rechts-
philosophie independently of Marx's commentary, one 
would find a description of a somewhat quaint, but cer-
tainly not necessarily repressive or even reactionary 
political system, at least not by early 19th century 
standards.(12] The state is generally described as a 
unifying cultural force and not exclusively political 
in character. The state has the central role of medi-
ating a higher freedom among the opposing forces of the 
family and civil society in a dynamic society. The in-
itial definition of §257 emphasizes, for example, the 
existence of the state as concrete 'ethical substance' 
which "exists immediately in custom, mediately in indi-
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vidual self-consciousness, knowledge, and activity, 
while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment 
towards the state finds in the state, as its essence 
and the end and product of its activity, its substan-
tive freedom." More significantly, Hegel is especially 
careful to emphasize the distinction between the state 
and civil society and the close relationship of his 
view to that of Rousseau, v/hose positive contribution 
to modern political theory is said to be that of making 
the will the principle of the state. Rousseau is 
criticized, however, for basing his conception of the 
state on the capricious individual will and not in the 
absolutely rational will which Hegel belives to be the 
basis of his own account of the state.(13) 
So, as long as Hegel is read on a relatively ab-
stract, philosophical level, it'is difficult to criti-
cize his account too harshly. For despite the distor-
tion of his views which may have occurred later, his 
central idea is perhaps only that the inherent ration-
ality of the state, by which he means its tendency to 
insure greater freedom and to express this tendency 
objectively, is exhibited in a constitution which is 
divided into the three 'moments', or divisions, upon 
which Marx focuses his major criticisms of the text; 
the Crown, the Executive and the Legislature. The 
Crown, for example, is thus given the role of symboliz-
ing the rational subjective will such as Hegel believed 
to be absent from Rousseau's theory of the state based 
upon a social contract. Yet that Hegel did not have 
anything at all like the idea of an absolute, tyranni-
cal monarch in mind in his conception of the Crown is 
clear from his description of a limited, constitutional 
monarchy of largely symbolical function in the Rechts-
philosophie. This largely symbolical role of the 
monarch is, in fact, clearly stated in the later addi-
tion to §280 of the text, where Hegel says that the 
monarch's role is only 
a question of the culminating point of a for-
mal decision. . . . He has only to say "yes" 
and dot the "i", because the throne should be 
such that the significant thing in its holder 
is not his particular make-up. . . . Whatever 
else the monarch may have in addition to this 
power of final decisions is part and parcel of 
his private character and should be of no 
consequence. Of course, there may be circum-
stances in which it is this private character 
alone which has prominence, but in that event 
the state is either not fully developed, or 
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else is badly constructed. In a well-
organized monarchy, the objective aspect 
belongs to the law alone, and the monarch's 
part is merely to set to the law the subjec-
tive "I will". 
For Hegel, then, the foundation of the state is not 
to be found simply in the Crown, as Marx no doubt must 
have realized as soon as he began to study the text in 
earnest; it is also based on the objective nature of 
universal law determined and established by the Legis-
lature and enforced by the Executive. This power of 
enforcing laws, i.e., 'the power to subsume single 
cases under the universal', requires then the existence 
of a well-educated and trained bureaucracy. Hegel's 
confidence in the value and ability of professional 
civil servants might, admittedly, seem somewhat naive 
to us, but, in fact, his kind of confidence is not dis-
similar to that found in most emerging nations even in 
the contemporary world and, also, certainly represented 
a very liberal alternative to the systems of civil ser-
vice then existing in France and England.[14] Similar-
ly, some objections might be raised against Hegel's 
remarks concerning the ineffectiveness of universal 
suffrage in his additions to §311 and his mixed and 
mostly negative views about the value of public opinion 
in §§315-19. But in both cases, his scepticism about 
the value of such modern ideals is reasonable and not 
clearly reactionary. Furthermore, his overall point of 
view generally shows a degree of liberal restraint 
against the dangers and excesses of the political 
revolt evident in the French Revolution. Hegel seems to 
have believed that a progressive, well-educated and 
trained bureaucracy could breath vitality into an 
otherwise somewhat backward political system as was to 
be found in the German states without subjecting the 
people to a violent revolution to attain modern politi-
cal ideals. But it was this very backwardness, such as 
was embodied in the power of the landed aristocracy in 
the Estates and, perhaps, favored by Hegel to a certain 
extent, that would become the very focus of Marx's at-
tack twenty years later. Clearly then, what Marx ob-
jected to in Hegel's political theory was not the sys-
tematic structure of the work itself which had at-
tempted to bring speculative rationality to an other-
wise jumbled political order, but rather that Hegel's 
belief in the progressive power of the bureaucracy had 
proven to be completely unfounded.[15] As we shall 
see, however, despite his trenchant criticism and even 
mis-reading of Hegel, Marx also took much more from the 
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Hegelian philosophy than he might have been willing to 
admit in the 1840's. 
What Hegel had emphasized in his political philoso-
phy was then the actual structure of the German state 
in so far as it was rational, i.e., promoted the 
greater freedom of the German people within their ov/n 
realm. What he avoided was the tendency to construct a 
merely rational idea of the state such as had never ex-
isted and could never be brought into existence.[16| 
But why? Why shouldn't Hegel have wanted to construct 
an ideal theory of the state by which these traditional 
governmental structures could be criticized and im-
proved upon? Because such an ideal construct might 
have deceived men into thinking that such a state might 
actually be constructed on earth through a violent, 
revolutionary program. This answer is straightforward 
enough, but it seems to make Hegel a reactionary in an 
age of revolution, just as he was said to be by 
Hobhouse.(17] But the fact of the matter is that Hegel 
hoped that the realization of the modern state might 
come about in Germany without the need for violent 
revolution, not that he was opposed to the realization 
of the modern state. For, just as Kant had previously 
argued in his short essay What is Enlightenment?, vio-
lent revolution only seems to trade one set of chains 
for another and do not really gain enlightenment for 
the entire nation.[18) Hegel's views on this matter, 
however, were probably much more influenced by his fav-
orable reading of Schiller's On the Aesthetic Education 
of Mankind, a work which was . only the first of a 
series of essays by German thinkers of this period who 
sought to improve the political systems of the German 
states without recourse to the fearful experience of 
the French Revolution.(19J Hegel, then, writing in 
1621, also wanted to emphasize the elements of ration-
ality in the existing, traditional German state struc-
ture even amidst its evident contradictions. This, of 
course, would not mean that he did not favor further 
development of this political system, but only that 
such development should be gradual and within the 
framework of the 'ethical life' of the people; for 
didn't Napoleon err when he "wished to give the 
Spaniards a constitution a priori"?(§274*) 
Marx's concern, however, was to emphasize the con-
tradictions within the existing German political struc-
ture and to challenge the validity of Hegel's account 
of that system as nothing more than a content to be 
plugged into the formal structure of the Logic. 
Consequently, from the very beginning of his critique 
of Hegel it is impossible for Marx to find a common 
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ground with the Rechtsphilosophie, since he has already 
rejected the method of the Logic as nothing more than 
mystification. But that this rejection is also part of 
a general failure to deal sympathetically with Hegel's 
text is also clearly suggested by his critique of 
Hegel's view of the Crown, for the view of the monarchy 
v/hich Marx finds in Hegel has little resemblance to 
Hegel's view. Nevertheless, emerging from Marx's some-
what misguided criticism of Hegel's account of the 
Crown is the perspective which leads to the generally 
more penetrating criticism of Hegel's entire theory of 
the state. Two main criticisms of Hegel dominate this 
section of the text. The first is directed against the 
presuppositions of his logic, which is revealed by the 
use of Feuerbach's transformative method: Hegel turns 
all real subjects into predicates by making all of 
reality subordinate to the development of the Concept. 
The second criticism is generally that Hegel does not 
take seriously enough the radical democratic tendencies 
which he criticizes in Rousseau. 
Marx's reliance on Feuerbach1s transformative meth-
od can actually be found in every section of the 
Kritik. But it is especially evident in this early sec-
tion of the manuscript, whereas in the later sections 
of the text he is more inclined to counter Hegel's 
'speculative' history with an empirical account of the 
actual development and contemporary structure of the 
German legislatures. Furthermore, the transformative 
method is used in the section on the Crov/n primarily in 
the service of a modern democratic point of view. For 
Marx says that the only reason that Hegel really needs 
to emphasize the individual subjectivity of the Crown 
is because he has ignored the real subjectivity of the 
particular individuals who actually comprise the state 
(KHS 22): 
He forgets that particular individuality is a 
human individual, and that the activities and 
agencies of the state are human activities. 
He forgets that the nature of the particular 
person is not his beard, his blood, his ab-
stract Physis, but rather his social quality, 
and that the activities of the state, etc., 
are nothing but the modes of existence and 
operations of the social qualities of men. 
Thus it is evident that individuals, in so far 
as they are the bearers of the state's activi-
ties and powers, are to be considered accord-
ing to their social and not their private 
quality. 
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The error of Hegel's method revealed by the trans-
formative method is that he takes the predicate 'sub-
jectivity' characteristic of 'subjects' just as 'per-
sonality' is characteristic of 'persons', but makes of 
it a universal subject for which particular 'subjects' 
and 'persons' are only predicates. Thus Hegel believes 
that the particular subjectivity of the Crown can be 
ignored, since he is only concerned with this subjec-
tivity as it symbolizes this abstract, universal 
subjectivity. This, according to Marx, is the mystifi-
cation created by placing the moment of subjectivity in 
the Constitution in the Crown instead of deriving it 
from real subjects, the people. For the people might 
believe that their 'subjectivity' is actually repre-
sented in the state structure, but, in fact, according 
to Marx, it is not, nor is there any truly representa-
tive structure by which this might occur. Hegel has 
thus attempted to make the state appear democratic by 
the symbol of the Crown, but just as the transformative 
method of Feuerbach was first directed against relig-
ious mystification, Marx also sees an element of relig-
ious mystification in Hegel's account of the Crown (KHS 
30) : 
Hegel proceeds from the state and makes man 
into the subjectified state; democracy starts 
with man and makes the state objectified man. 
Just as it is not religion that creates man 
but man who creates religion, so it is not the 
constitution that creates the people but the 
people which creates the constitution. In a 
certain respect democracy is to all other 
forms of the state what Christianity is to all 
other religions. Christianity is. . . the 
essence of religion, deified man under the 
form of a particular religion. In the same 
way democracy is the essence of every politi-
cal constitution, socialized man under the 
form of a particular constitution of the 
state. . . . Man does not exist because of 
the law but rather the law exists for the good 
of man. Democracy is human existence, while 
in the other political forms man has only 
legal existence. That is the fundamental 
difference of democracy. 
Why, then, according to Marx, does mystification 
occur in Hegel's system? The important thing to under-
stand is that Marx's analysis is not simply a straight-
forward argument in which Hegel's political philosophy 
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is opposed to modern democratic ideals. For if this 
were the case Marx would have had to take a little more 
seriously Hegel's objections to the political theory of 
Rousseau. Yet there is a sense in which Marx's analy-
sis is closer to semiotics than comparative political 
theory. In otherwords, Marx is more concerned to de-
code the symbolism of the Crown in Hegel's Staats-
rechts. Hegel say3 that it is necessary to provide a 
moment of subjectivity to the rational will centered in 
the state, without which the state can not be under-
stood as a reflection of the individual human rational 
will and a living, grov/ing organic unity. Marx, on the 
other hand, argues that the Crown simply serves to 
reconcile the individual to the alienation typical of 
modern political life in which the individual's social 
life no longer has any real political significance. 
But the difficulty with Marx's analysis at this stage 
of the argument is that it really depends upon more 
than would be justified by an unbiased commentary on 
Hegel's account of the Crown. For it does not seem to 
be the case that Hegel intended that the Crown should 
symbolize all that Marx thinks it does. The reason 
that Hegel believed that the Crown should not convey 
any sense whatsoever of individual or particular sub-
jectivity is not because he didn't think that such sub-
jectivity should be represented in the state. Nor is 
he trying to deceive the people into believing that 
their particular subjectivity is represented in the ab-
stract universal subjectivity of the monarch. Hegel's 
point is rather just what he says it is: he does not 
believe that individual or particular subjectivity is 
appropriate to the monarch. He believes instead that 
the kind of subjectivity which Marx is concerned to 
bring into the state structure is to be found instead 
in the development of the Executive in so far as all 
subjects can enter the civil service, and the 
Legislature, which is intended to represent the 
individual's social existence through the limited uni-
versality of his class standing in society. Marx's 
criticism of the symbolism of the Crown is thus really 
dependent upon the development of the rest of the 
Kritik. For it is only on this basis that it can be 
appreciated in just what sense Hegel's account of the 
Crown really is mystification, since in the remainder 
of the commentary Marx argues that there is no real in-
dividuality represented in the other tv/o 'moments' of 
the state either. 
V/hat is most interesting in Marx's analysis of the 
Crown is thus not his specific criticisms of Hegelian 
monarchy, v/hich is in many respects nothing more than 
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an insightful mis-reading of the text since Hegel seems 
to place much less emphasis on the monarchy than Marx 
seems to think, but the less specific remarks in this 
section directed tov/ard an analysis of the distinctly 
modern character of 'political life1 which fosters a 
concern for the creation and legitimization of the 
state. For, according to Marx, "The abstraction of the 
state as such belongs only to modern times because the 
abstraction of private life belongs only to modern 
times. The abstraction of the state is a modern pro-
duct" (KHS 32). Furthermore, the very need to explain 
how the modern state is really based upon the private 
individual is only a reflection of the desire to free 
the individual from the realm of the political sphere 
as it had been conceived in the medieval period. Or, 
as Marx claims (KHS 32): "In the Middle Ages popular 
life and state (i.e., political) life were identical. 
Man was the actual principle of the state, but he was 
unfree man. It was therefore the democracy of unfree-
dom, accomplished alienation. The abstract, reflected 
opposition (between popular life and state-, or 
political-life] belongs only to modern times." 
Similarly, the modern political sphere is distinguished 
from that of the Greek and Oriental worlds (KHS 32-33): 
In immediate monarchy, democracy, aristo-
cracy there is yet no political constitution 
in distinction from the actual material state 
or from the remaining content of popular life. 
The political sphere does not yet appear as 
the form of the material state. Either, as in 
Greece, the res publica was the real private 
concern, the real content of the citizen, and 
the private man was slave, that is, the polit-
ical state as political was the true and sole 
content of the citizen's life and will; or, as 
in Asian despotism, the political state was 
nothing but the private will of a single 
individual, and the political state, like the 
material state, was slave. What distinguishes 
the modern state from these states in which a 
substantial unity between people and state ob-
tained is not that the various moments of the 
constitution are formed into particular 
actuality, as Hegel would have it, but rather 
that the constitution itself has been formed 
into a particular actuality alongside the real 
life of the people, the political state has 
become the constitution of the rest of the 
state. 
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So what we should also look for in the remainder of 
the text is Marx's explanation of how this split has 
come about in the modern world. But this explanation 
will depend upon concrete economic and historical stu-
dies intended primarily to show the anachronistic 
character of Hegel's account of the Legislature and not 
the mystification inherent in the speculative philoso-
phy. For just as Marx says that Hegel uses the symbol 
of the Crown to make people think that they really have 
a share in the modern state, he is also concerned to 
show that the other moments of Hegel's constitution ob-
scure the real situation of the modern v/orld in which 
extensive talk about the rationality of the state is in 
fact only a mask covering up its fundamental 
irrationality. 
I l l 
Marx's criticism of Hegel's account of the Execu-
tive may be discussed more briefly, yet it is in this 
sphere that the real thrust of his critique of Hegel's 
concept of the state clearly emerges in its most recog-
nizable form: the state structure does not really 
serve the universal interests of the community, but 
only the interests of the middle-class, or civil socie-
ty (burgherliehe Gesellschaft). Hegel's own remarks 
about the Executive are, of course, also quite brief; 
Marx says that they don't even merit the name of a 
philosophical development as "most of the paragraphs 
could be found verbatim in the Prussian Landrecht" (KHS 
44). Hegel, for example, says explicitly that the 
civil servants and higher officials serve the 'state's 
universal interest' and thus transcend the particular 
interest of civil society found in the bureaucracy of 
the Corporations ( §§288-89). Hegel also argues that 
merely by being appointed to the civil service, the in-
dividual will necessarily give up his particular in-
terests (§294*). Hegel also provides us with several 
other arguments which are intended to demonstrate the 
faithfulness of civil servants to the performance of 
their duties. The officials are hierarchically organ-
ized and are ansv/erable to the Crown and stand in oppo-
sition to the power of the Corporations which might 
check on their possible abuses ( §295). The civil 
servants are well-educated and trained and, because of 
the size of the state, problematical conflicts of per-
sonal and state responsibilities are less likely to a-
rise (§296). The civil servants are chosen primarily 
from the middle-class, "the class in which the con-
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sciousness of right and the developed intelligence of 
the mass of the people are to be found" (§297). 
Marx's response to all of this is also brief and to 
the point. The bureaucracy is really nothing more than 
the further organization of civil society at a higher 
level than that found in the corporate bureaucracy. 
Hegel thinks that he has refounded the state on a 
higher level, but this is only a requirement of the 
Logic and not what has actually occurred. Simply to 
duplicate the same corporate structure within the state 
structure and calling it the state does not really 
raise this structure to any higher level whatsoever. 
So although Hegel's description of the bureaucracy 
might be quite accurate, his logic obscures its 
function. This, then, is simply the crux of Marx's 
view that the state is nothing more than the repressive 
organization of civil society for its own best in-
terests (KHS 45): "Hegel develops no content of the 
bureaucracy, but merely some general indications of its 
formal organization; and indeed the bureaucracy is 
merely the formalism of a content which lies outside 
the bureaucracy itself." Here, also, is the basis of 
the later view that the state is a 'superstructure' 
based upon the material life of the economic sphere 
(KHS 45-46): 
The Corporations are the materialism of the 
bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy is the spir-
itualism of the Corporations. The Corporation 
is the bureaucracy of civil society, and the 
bureaucracy is the Corporation of the State. 
In actuality, the bureaucracy as civil society 
of the state is opposed to the state of civil 
society, the Corporations. Where the bureauc-
racy is to become a new principle, where the 
universal interest of the state begins to 
become explicitly a singular and thereby a 
real interest, it struggles against the ex-
istence of its premisses. On the other hand 
once the real life of the state awakens and 
civil society frees itself from the 
Corporations out of its inherent rational 
impulse, the bureaucracy seeks to restore 
them; for as soon as the state of civil socie-
ty falls so too does the civil society of the 
state. The spiritualism vanishes with its op-
posite materialism. . . . The same mind that 
creates the Corporation in society creates the 
bureaucracy in the state. Thus as soon as the 
corporation mind is attacked so too is the 
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mind of the bureaucracy; and whereas the 
bureaucracy earlier fought the existence of 
the Corporation in order to create room for 
its own existence, now it seeks vigorously to 
sustain the existence of the Corporation in 
order to save the Corporation mind, which is 
its own mind. 
Thus, according to Marx, the very situation which 
brings the bureaucracy into existence in the modern 
world also makes it practically impossible to do the 
work which Hegel would want it to perform. Nor, as we 
would expect, does Marx take very seriously any of 
Hegel's explanations about how the bureaucracy is to 
work for the universal interest. But perhaps most 
telling of the confusion in Hegel's system is the fact 
that the police and the judiciary are given a place in 
both civil society and the state and that the monarch, 
as head of the executive, is also given a role in the 
objective structure as well as the subjective 'I will'. 
This, however, is only further evidence of the mystifi-
cation involved in Hegel's view of the Crown (KHS 51-
52): "The monarch distributes and entrusts the partic-
ular state activities as functions to the officials, 
i.e., he distributes the state among the bureaucrats, 
entrusts it like the holy Roman Church entrusts conse-
crations. . . . The sovereignty residing in the crown 
is taken here in a clearly mystical way, just as the 
theologian finds the personal God in nature." 
Finally, then, we come to the discussion of the 
longest section of the manuscript, Marx's criticism of 
Hegel's account of the Legislature, after which it will 
only be necessary to note his commentary on the opening 
sections of Hegel's explanation of how the state 
emerges from the earlier stages of ethical life, the 
family and civil society. Hegel's discussion of the 
Legislature, like that of the Executive, is also rela-
tively brief, but Marx's commentary is not. Hegel's 
remarks focus, in turn, upon the nature of the Estates, 
the deputies, and finally upon the role of public opin-
ion and freedom of pvtblic communication in the state. 
Marx's criticism focuses primarily upon the first two 
of these and the observation that just as Hegel has 
deluded himself about the role of the executive in or-
der to make it fit nicely into his system, he has also 
deceived himself about the role of the Estates. For, 
according to Hegel, the Estates are the moment of ac-
tual subjectivity, not merely the formal subjectivity 
as was to be found in the Crown (§301): "The Estates 
have the function of bringing public affairs into ex-
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istence not only implicitly, but also actually, i.e., 
of bringing into existence the moment of subjective 
formal freedom, the public consciousness as an empiri-
cal universal, of which the thoughts and opinions of 
the Many are particulars." Furthermore, just as the 
traditional French Estates, prior to their suspension 
in 1614 and before they were reconvened prior to the 
Revolution and were transformed into the National, Con-
stituent, and, finally, the Legislative Assembly, Hegel 
presupposes that the German Estates still represent 
true class distinctions within early 19th century 
German society. But Marx criticizes this view severely 
and focuses his criticism on Hegel's account of the 
'agricultural class' within the Estates, which, accord-
ing to the Rechtsphilosophie, was to be guaranteed its 
place in the legislative structure by rights of land 
and birth. 
Marx's criticism of this section begins then with a 
discussion of the anachronistic role of the Estates in 
modern German states. He argues that their existence 
actually disconfirms and does not support Hegel's 
logic. Although the members of the Estates, while 
rooted in the family or civil society, should also be 
able to transcend their position in these sphere, by 
Hegel's own admission the 'agricultural class' has a 
privileged position precisely because it remains repre-
sentative of the rarified family structure of the 
landed aristocracy (§§306-307): 
This class is more particularly fitted for 
political position and significance in that 
its capital is independent alike of the 
state's capital, the uncertainty of business, 
the guest for profit, and any sort of fluctua-
tions in possessions. . . . It is even forti-
fied against its own willfulness, because 
those members of this class who are called to 
political life are not entitled, as other 
citizens are, either to dispose of their en-
tire property at will, or to the assurance 
that it will pass to their children, whom they 
love equally, in similarly egual divisions. 
Hence their wealth becomes inalienable, 
entailed, and burdened by primogeniture. . . . 
The right of this section of the agricultural 
class is thus based in a way on the natural 
principle of the family. 
So the representatives of the 'agricultural class' are 
not expected to stand for election because they repre-
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sent an element of society that must necessarily be 
given a place within the Legislature, the natural prin-
ciple of the family. By contrast, the deputies of the 
second section of the Estates, which "comprises the 
fluctuating elements in civil society" (§308), must 
stand for election so that the electors can choose 
those who they feel best qualified to make decisions in 
the Estates—but not because any particular point of 
view demands representation. The section of Hegel's 
text on the Legislature is thus clearly the least 
developed part of his text, but this was probably 
because the legislatures were the least developed part 
of the state structure in Germany in 1820. Thus Marx 
must also attack this section of the text with the most 
severe historical and economic criticism, for example, 
by contrasting the role of the legislature in a truly 
modern state, the French government of 1789-92 (or un-
til the Legislative function took on the exclusive role 
of the Executive), with the backwardness of the German 
situation which allowed the ascendancy of power in the 
bureaucracy in the interests of civil society precisely 
because the legislative structure could not have 
fostered any progressive developments whatsoever. For, 
on the one hand, the agricultural section of the 
Estates is rooted in a semi-feudal existence which 
Hegel thinks must be preserved, both within the society 
and in the Legislature. But the section of the 
Legislature rooted in civil society is not guaranteed a 
very secure existence at all, for no provisions are 
made to guarantee the deputies any career development 
or much security, nor do they represent anything more 
than the supposedly impermanent, fluctuating existence 
of the interests within civil society. As a conse-
quence, even the civil servants have a more secure 
place within the state strucure than the deputies of 
the second Estate, the deputies themselves are really 
dependent upon serving the interests of their consti-
tuency in the most narrow fashion if they are to sur-
vive in office, and the lower classes can attain repre-
sentation in the state only by becoming a part of the 
entrenched bureaucracy. So, given these almost neces-
sarily irreconciable forces within the legislative 
bodies of the German states, they were to remain an 
ineffective or even reactionary force within the 
development of the German states for years to come.(20) 
Moreover, Marx also argues that Hegel seems even to be 
confused about whether the Legislative is really a part 
of the constitution, or outside of it, since it is the 
body which can alter the constitution, and that changes 
in the French constitution between 1789 and 1795 were 
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in fact accompanied by violent uprisings and certainly 
did not come about gradually as Hegel argues to be 
possible within his structure. Nor does the 
Legislature come any closer to representing the actual 
subjective will than the Crown the formal subjective 
will, for its function in this regard is also largely 
symbolical. So Marx concludes that the mystification 
in Hegel's view of the Legislature results from the at-
tempt to make a fundamentally medieval institution, the 
Estates as represented in legislative bodies, do the 
work of reconcilliation needed in the modern world 
where the relationships of property, finance and the 
political system have become greatly transformed. 
One can, then, actually find all the oppositions 
and contradictions within the political structure of 
early 19th century Germany that Hegel thinks are there 
and need to be there according to his political theory; 
but these oppositions and contradictions are not there-
by resolved in the higher order of the state just 
because they all have a place within the Constitution, 
according to Marx. But the reason for this is not that 
the state is nothing apart from such oppositions and 
contradictions, as Hegel might point out in his own 
defense, but because the Hegelian idea of the state 
serves no real function except to rationalize the ef-
fects of these difficulties in v/hich state power can 
only be effective as the 'executive committee' of the 
ruling classes, i.e., the landed aristocracy and the 
powerful elements of civil society. The ultimate ser-
vice of the state thus becomes nothing more than the 
legitimization of these interests in power and main-
taining the alienation inherent in the modern idea of 
private property subject to no real political control. 
So it should not be surprising that the further 
analysis of such themes as alienation, private proper-
ty, rent of land, money, and communism as the essential 
nature of man, come to take a central place in the 
"Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" of 1844.(21] 
Probably the best summary of the force of the 
Kritik is thus found in the brief "A Contribution to 
the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right': Intro-
duction", in which Marx capsulizes all of these criti-
cisms in the observation that whereas in France this 
new idea of a state emerged as a result of an actual 
revolution, in Germany it all happened only in the 
ratiocination of speculative philosophy (KHS 137): 
If it was only in Germany that the speculative 
philosophy of right was possible—this ab-
stract and extravagant thought about the mod-
288 
ern state, whose reality remains in another 
world (even though this is just across the 
Rhine)--the German thoughtversion 
[GedankenbiId 1 of the modern state, on the 
other hand, which abstracts only from actual 
man, was only possible because and in so far 
as the modern state itself abstracts from the 
actual man, or satisfied the v/hole man only in 
an imaginary way. In politics the Germans 
have thought what other nations have done. 
Germany v/as their theoretical conscience. The 
abstract and presumptive character of its 
thinking v/as in step with the putrid and 
stunted character of their actuality. If, 
then, the status quo of the German political 
system expresses the perfection of the ancien 
regime, the thorn in the flesh of the modern 
state, the status quo of German political 
thought expresses the imperfection of the mod-
ern state, the damaged condition of the flesh 
itself. 
IV 
Considering all that has already been said about 
Marx's criticisms of each of the three 'moments' of 
Hegel's view of the state as exhibited in its constitu-
tion, it should not be difficult now to comment briefly 
on his notes to the first sub-section of Hegel's text, 
§§261-274, which is concerned not with the individual 
'moments' of the constitution, but the concept of the 
state as it is exhibited in a constitution in general. 
Two specific issues from these initial comments are 
relevant here. First, Marx challenges Hegel's account 
of the transition from family and civil society to the 
state. Secondly, Marx questions Hegel's account of the 
state as an organic unity. 
The more concrete reasons for Marx's criticism on 
the first point should be clear from the previous 
discussion of his comments on the Legislature, which 
v/as actually comprised of one Estate rooted in the 
family and another rooted in civil society. For Marx 
could never have said that these two Estates not only 
stand in a productive opposition to each other within 
the total structure of the state, as Hegel might argue, 
but to use an electronic metaphor, that they are com-
pletely out of phase with each other when viewed 
historically. Marx's comments in the opening section of 
t n e Kritik are largely theoretical and not historical, 
however. They are, consequently, very similiar to the 
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kind of criticism found in the section on the Crown. 
For example, similar to Marx's view that Hegel derives 
democracy from monarchy, which he considers illegiti-
mate if not impossible, Marx complains in the opening 
section of the text that Hegel actually makes family 
and civil society dependent on the state rather than 
deriving the state from the less abstract forms. 
Hegel's procedure, however, simply involves the appli-
cation of the categories of the Logic to the actual 
world. Hegel, of course, believed that this was the 
real accomplishment of his approach to Staats-
Wissenschaft, whereas Marx says that it is the basis of 
the mystification inherent in the entire Rechts-
philosophie (KHS 10): 
The transition is not derived from the spe-
cific essence of the family, etc., and the 
specific essence of the state, but rather from 
the universal relation- of necessity and 
freedom. Exactly the same transition is ef-
fected in the Logic from the sphere of Essence 
t;o the sphere of the Concept, and in the 
Philosophy of Nature from Inorganic Nature of 
Life. It is always the same categories of-
fered as the animating principle now of one 
sphere, now of another, and the only thing of 
importance is to discover, for the particular 
concrete determinations, the corresponding ab-
stract ones. 
But this explanation is again criticized for exhibiting 
the confusion of reversing the real subject (KHS 9): 
"The actual Idea reduces itself into the finiteness of 
the family and civil society only in order to enjoy and 
to bring forth its infinity through their transcendence 
IAufhebung 1. . . . The fact is that the state issues 
from the mass of men existing as members of families 
and civil society; but speculative philosophy expresses 
this fact as an achievement of the Idea." 
Similarly, Hegel is said to commit the same error 
in his account of the constitution as an organic unity. 
But from our overview of the remainder of the text it 
it clear that Marx is preoccupied with the fact that 
there is hardly any unity whatsoever in the structure 
of the German state in the 1840's, no less a total or-
ganic unity (KHS 14): 
Hegel has done nothing but resolve the consti-
tution of the state into the universal, ab-
stract idea of the organism; but in appearance 
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and in hia own opinion he has developed the 
determinate reality out of the universal idea. 
He has made the subject of the idea into a 
product and predicate of the Idea. He does 
not develop his thought out of what is 
objective, but what is objective in accordance 
with a ready-made thought which has its origin 
in the abstract sphere of logic. 
V 
What conclusions can be drawn then from this exami-
nation of Marx's critique of Hegel's concept of the 
state in the Kritik? The basis for the Marxist cri-
tique of the modern state, which only serves to 
further, and not resolve, the disturbances of modern 
political life--except insofar as they lead to the con-
soling dialectics of speculative philosophy, is quite 
obvious. Similarly, we see Marx moving from a simple 
theoretical critique of Hegel's text to a more concrete 
analysis of historical and economic structures typical 
, of later works like the German Ideology and, of course. 
Capital. This kind of analysis also suggests that the 
political structure does not stand in an immediate 
unity to an observer, as Hegel seems to have thought, 
but is actually layered with the remnants of various 
periods of political life and development, like the ar-
chaeological remains of a city buried underneath a 
living, active community. I have also suggested, how-
ever, that Hegel had very clear and not at all unreas-
onable motives for his project and was not himself 
merely so confused about many aspects of contemporary 
German life as Marx's analysis might lead one to 
believe. Yet all this is only to say that Hegel could 
have been just as sceptical about the vitality of the 
German political structure if he had written in the 
1840's as was Marx, but that such scepticism would not 
have been consistent with his philosophy of history or, 
consequently, the speculative spirit of the Rechts-
philosophie. 
But just as the clear differences betv/een Marx and 
Hegel should not be resolved by making Marx into a neo-
Hegelian or Hegel into a proto-Marxist, neither should 
v/e ignore Marx's indebtedness to Hegel. One very clear 
example of this indebtedness is, of course, the fact 
that Marx proposes that if the bureaucracy cannot serve 
as the universal class, perhaps the proletariat can, a 
view which might ov/e as much to Hegelian mystification 
as stated at the end of the "Contribution to a Critique 
of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" as anything Hegel him-
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self could have written (KHS 141-142).[22] But doesn't 
this suggest that Marx, too, wanted to return to the 
formal structure of Hegel's logic, even despite his 
criticism of this project, and simply fill it in with 
the correct empirical content? Similarly, Marx must 
alsp be understood as having been as concerned as Hegel 
had been in his youth that there actually was no modern 
state in Germany, except in thought, as with the fact 
that the modern state is a creation of alienated con-
sciousness. For Marx is not concerned solely with the 
abolition of the state or a return to the 'unfree 
democracy' of the medieval era, but with the realiza-
tion of the true state and its real transcendence 
(Aufhebung). This view could only have force, however, 
if Marx remained committed to the view that Hegel had, 
in fact, given us an idealized account of the develop-
ment of ethical life and not the actual account his 
philosophical program led him to believe he had con-
structed. Marx's attempt must be viewed then as much 
as a preliminary exercise of a larger effort to re-do 
Hegel's project as a criticism of that project. For if 
there is not an 'actual' development of 'ethical life' 
in the world and within world-history, Marx would have 
to accept the point of view which Hegel was perhaps 
most interested in overcoming in the Rechtsphilosophie, 
the acceptance of the existence of an inseperable gap 
between ought and is. But for Marx, the apparent gap 
between ought and is, between true self-consciousness 
and the alienated consciousness characteristic of man 
in modern society, was not to be overcome though specu-
lative philosophy, but by altering the economic condi-
tions which had produced and maintained this false con-
sciousness within the structure of the modern state as 
it then existed. 
Marx, and many of his ideological descendants, may 
not have come any closer in practice than Hegel in the 
effort to overcome the apparent gap between ought and 
is. But the clear difference between their methods of 
realizing this goal and with it the realization of the 
true freedom which is the end of history can now be 
clearly stated. For Hegel this freedom is ultimately 
realizable only within the institutional structure that 
expresses the 'ethical life' of the people as it is em-
bodied in its constitution, v/hereas for Marx such in-
stitutions can never be more than a temporary means to 
the realization of such freedom and may tend over a 
period of time to rationalize alientated consciousness 
and not freedom. But it must also be obvious that on a 
practical level, what Marx's program first demands is 
the realization of a true state, one which in effect 
292 
could actually reconcile the opposing interests of 
civil society, just as Hegel said it should. Such a 
view of Marx may, of course, be at the basis of Lenin's 
concept of the semi-, or proletarian-state, which was 
to take control after the violent revolution in which 
the old state structure was to have been smashed (zer-
brochen) . Perhaps so, although one may well question 
whether the institutional structure of the state as 
Lenin envisioned could ever really be successful, or if 
Lenin's greater emphasis on the destructive forces of 
revolution and his optimism about the ability of the 
semi-state to quickly reconcile the opposing forces of 
society doesn't distort and underestimate the Hegelian 
presuppositions still evident in Marx's early program. 
Wasn't it, after all, the position of the Communist 
Manifesto that the 'battle of democracy' was to be won 
through a program of parliamentary reforms rather than 
through the total destruction of all the institutions 
of the existing state? But if this is so, it might 
also turn out that the fundamental .differences between 
Hegel and Marx become more a matter of emphasis due to 
their specific historical situations with respect to 
the development of the German states than one of 
substance. For all that Marx might have been asking 
for was the elimination of those institutions which 
could not truly represent the ethical life of the 
people because of the distortions maintained by 
economic or historical factors and the creation and 
maintenance of those which could. The Revolution of 
1848 failed, however, and during the period that 
followed, culminating in the Bismarkian state—which 
like the German states of the 1840's did not really owe 
its inspiration to the Hegelian political philosophy at 
ail, Marxists became more and more opposed to the in-
stitutional structures of all the existing European 
states.[23] 
Marxists have then been generally more concerned 
with the destruction of the 'mediating* institutional 
structures that Hegel believed were essential for the 
preservation of rights in the modern state than with 
their further development. As a consequence, there is 
a tendency toward anarchism in Marxism or the view that 
institutional structures can either arise spontaneously 
from the good will of the people, e.g., the Paris Com-
mune, or that developing liberal institutions are ex-
pendable, e.g., the Russian Parliament in 1917. Per-
haps it is even due to the fact that there has been 
such little serious attention given to the role of such 
'mediating' institutions in the modern state that 
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Marxists' states have often been more reactionary or 
even totalitarian than the states opposed by,Marx. 
This tendency to neglect the study of the positive 
role of institutional structures in the modern state 
need not be a consequence of taking seriously Marx's 
Kritik des HegeIschen Staatsrechts, however. In oppos-
ing the specific, underdeveloped state structures in 
Germany of the 1840's Marx need not have also rejected 
out of hand the positive contributions of Hegel to the 
theory of the modern state, but only have questioned 
whether or not the actual German states were still pre-
dominately rational, i.e., whether or not they could 
really fulfill the role and function ascribed to them 
by Hegel in the Rechtsphilosophie and the Lectures on 
the Philosophy of History. If Marx had understood 
Hegel better and not so glibly accepted the identifica-
tion of the Hegelian view of the state in the 1810's 
with that of the German states in the 1840's advanced 
by right-wing Hegelians, his criticism of Hegel's text 
might have been much more limited and centered mainly 
on the historical and economic reasons why Hegel had 
overestimated the possibility of the German states to 
develop rationally after the 1820's. Marx might even 
have gained a view of the Hegelian philosophy richer 
than that in which the proletariat simply replaces the 
bureaucracy as the 'universal class' which can bring 
about the human emancipation of mankind without any 
concern whatsoever for the preservation or development 
of the social institutions that might protect the 
rights of all citizens in the process. Because, 
however, Marx confused the actual states of Germany in 
the 1840's with the genuinely reform minded states that 
Hegel had described in the 1820's in his original 
lectures, and because he was not content to limit his 
criticism to the specific historical and economic fac-
tors that would inhibit the development of the states 
that Hegel had described, his critique went far beyond 
what was really justified and perhaps also helped set 
the stage for the 'positivist' vision of the state that 
has characterized so much of modern communism as v/ell 
as fascism rather than the 'dialectical' vision of 
Hegel's Staatswissenschaft. (24) 
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Our answer: in the formulation of a 
class with radical chains, a class in civil 
society that is not of civil society, a class 
that is the dissolution of all classes, a 
sphere of society having a universal character 
because of its universal suffering and claim-
ing no particular right because no particular 
wrong but unqualified wrong is perpetuated on 
it; a sphere that can claim no traditional 
title but only a human title; a sphere that 
does not stand partially opposed to the 
consequences, but totally opposed to the pre-
mises of the German political system; a 
sphere, finally, that cannot emancipate itself 
without emancipating itself from all the other 
spheres of society, thereby emancipating them; 
a sphere, in short, that is the complete loss 
of humanity and can only redeem itself through 
the total redemption of humanity. The dis-
solution of society existing as a particular 
class is the proletariat." 
2 10ne must remember that Marx, during the 1840*s, 
could perhaps be best described as a radical democrat 
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and that in the Kritik the demand for universal suf-
frage and 'direct democracy' is at the center of his 
projected political program to provide for true indiv-
idual representation in the state, a point clearly 
stated in the following passage (KHS 121): 
In unrestricted suffrage, both active and pas-
sive, civil society has actually raised itself 
for the first time to an abstraction of 
itself, to political existence as its true 
universal and essential existence. But the 
full achievement of this abstraction is at 
once also the transcendence (Aufhebung) of the 
abstraction. In actually establishing its 
political existence as its true existence 
civil society has simultaneously established 
its civil existence, in distinction from its 
political existence, as inessential. And with 
the one separated, the other, its opposite, 
falls. Within the abstract political state 
the reform of voting advances the dissolution 
(Auflosung) of this political state, but also 
the dissolution of civil society. 
Or, to state the matter a little more concisely, "In 
true democracy the political state disappears" for "In 
democracy the abstract state has ceased to be the gov-
erning moment" (KHS 31). 
**See esp., Marcuse, Reason and Revolution. 
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